In 1974, the Ford Foundation published its survey The Finances of the Performing Arts, covering the fiscal years 1965-66 to 1970-71. It included 166 organizations, consisting of twenty-seven nonprofit resident theaters, thirty-one operas, ninety-one symphonies, nine ballets, and eight modern dance companies. The report led to three primary conclusions. First, half of the organizations surveyed failed to balance their budgets in fiscal year 1970-71. Second, contributed income would have to increase substantially in the future for these organizations just to maintain their 1970-71 position. Third, "the local private sector . . . will in all probability remain the principal supporter of the performing arts."[1] The less optimistic of two alternative speculations made in the report was that local private contributions would have to increase fourfold, in constant dollars, over the following ten years to close the gap between expenses and earned income. This was a scary forecast, and we now can assess its prophetic accuracy.

This article is a progress report on a survey similar to that of the Ford Foundation, which was undertaken to ascertain what has happened to the finances of the nonprofit performing arts since 1971-72. It is based on a constant sample of thirty-nine orchestras over twenty-one years; seven ballet companies and six modern dance companies over ten years; and twenty-four opera companies over twelve years. (A fourth set for thirty-three theaters over twelve years is presently under preparation.) The samples are unique in that they comprise the same companies each year, the samples having been limited to only those organizations that reported the status of their finances consistently. There is, naturally, a tradeoff between the number of companies included and the number of years covered. The further back one goes, the fewer companies for which data are available. The initial decision as to how many years to include was made in such a way as to maximize the product of the number of years times the number of companies.

The data themselves were obtained from the respective service organizations, in some cases only after obtaining the explicit written permission of each individual company in the sample. All of the figures presented are inflation-adjusted totals for all the companies in a particular sample. The price index used to deflate the current dollar figures is the fixed-weight Gross Domestic Product deflator for consumption expenditures, not the Consumer Price Index, which was seriously flawed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

I will discuss the funding patterns of symphony orchestras, dance companies, and opera companies and draw some conclusions about the present financial state of the nonprofit performing arts. Due to limits of length, it will not be possible to discuss all of the information in the tables. The reader is invited to peruse them at leisure.

The orchestra data set spans the longest period, the twenty-one years from fiscal year 1971-72 through 1991-92. The sample includes twenty-five large orchestras, seven medium-sized ones, and seven small ones. The revenues of the twenty-five large orchestras, at one time referred to as "major orchestras," comprise about seven-eighths of the revenues of all large orchestras, so this sample can be regarded as fairly representative of large orchestras. On the other hand, the number of medium (formerly "regional") and small (formerly "metropolitan") orchestras is too small to be considered as accurately reflecting developments in their respective groups; however, they are the only ones that reported consistently throughout the twenty-one years.

Table 1 shows the changes in real revenues, real expenses, and some operational data for all thirty-nine orchestras combined for the first and last years of the study. Both total revenues and total expenses increased by about 125 percent in inflation-adjusted terms over the twenty-one years. Noncontributed[2] income increased by slightly more than contributed in-come--130 percent versus 120 percent. Of the contributed income, private support increased vastly more than government support--167 percent versus 12 percent. The categories of private support that grew the most were foundation support, which increased more than thirty times over, and corporate support, which more than tripled. Among government support, a 38 percent decline in real National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) contributions and a nine percent drop in local support occurred, while state support more than doubled.

In the expense categories, orchestra salaries grew at only just over half the rate of total expenses--68 percent versus 125 percent. Total artists' salaries and production expense also grew at a slower rate than total expenses. Production expense increased the least, and development and advertising expense grew the most. However, both of these latter two expense categories still make up a rather small portion of total expenses. The trends exhibited by orchestra expense categories are mirrored in the opera and dance data.

The real deficit actually grew more slowly than expenses and in fiscal 1991-92 represented a slightly smaller percentage of total revenues than in fiscal 1971-72--4.9 percent in fiscal 1992 versus 5.4 percent in 1972. This was unexpected because deficits have been increasing at an alarming rate in recent years, as shown in figure 1.

The real average subscription price nearly doubled, while attendance at in-home subscription concerts increased by one-third--from three million to four million--for these thirty-nine orchestras. The number of subscription concerts increased by half. The real average ticket price for all concerts increased by much more--135 percent; total season attendance declined by 4 percent, and the total number of performances rose only by 8 percent.

Table 1 also shows the percentage of total revenues and of contributed income represented by each of the subcategories of income. An interesting finding is that there was practically no change in the proportion of noncontributed and contributed income over the twenty-one-year span. The big changes came about in the distribution of contributed income, with private support increasing from 25 percent to roughly 30 percent, and government subsidy declining from 11 percent to half that. NEA support now only constitutes a little over one percent of total revenues.

Most noteworthy in the percentage distribution of expenses is the decline in the proportion accounted for by salaries, particularly orchestra salaries. Production expense also diminished in importance.

The story changes somewhat when one considers large, medium, and small orchestras separately. Table 2 shows the percentage change and compound rates of growth of the various sources of income for each group. Table 3 does the same for expenses and selected operational data. It is immediately apparent that the seven medium-sized orchestras enjoyed a higher rate of growth than either the large or the small orchestras. Their revenues from all sources, except season- and single-ticket income grew more rapidly. This was also the only group to see an increase in NEA support. Their expenses also increased most rapidly, except those for marketing/advertising, which grew even more for the small orchestras. Among the operational data, attendance at in-home subscription concerts increased the most for the small orchestras. The medium-sized ones experienced faster growth in both total attendance and number of concerts, while holding down their ticket price increases.

Table 4 compares the various income sources as a percentage of total revenue in fiscal years 1971-72 and 1991-92. The proportion of noncontributed income increased slightly for large orchestras while declining somewhat for both medium and small orchestras. The converse is necessarily true of contributed income. The most significant difference among the three groups is the decline in the proportion of regular season ticket income earned by the medium orchestras, coupled with a 17.4 percent increase in income from other concerts. This group has been the most active in trying to reach new audiences by expanding the range of its repertoire to include more popular music and by increasing the number of performances. The other major distinction of the medium-sized orchestras is that they suffered a smaller drop in government support, partly because they were not as reliant on it to begin with.

A comparison of expense categories as percentages of total expenses (table 5) shows that all three groups of orchestras now spend a smaller proportion on artists' salaries, particularly orchestra salaries, and on production. On the other hand, a higher percentage goes toward advertising, development, and, except for medium orchestras, administrative expenses.

A quick calculation of the effectiveness of both advertising and development dollars reveals that both hit diminishing returns from the outset. Each dollar spent on development by large orchestras brought in $21.40 in real contributions in 1971-72 and $6.70 in 1991-92. This amount has held surprisingly steady since fiscal year 1985-86. The return for medium orchestras was $6.38 in 1991-92, compared with $140 in 1971-72; there has been no further decline since 1986-87. The small orchestras, surprisingly, have the largest return per development dollar spent--$11.44 in fiscal year 1991-92, compared with $56.88 in 1976-77, when they began reporting development activities. This figure is continuing to decline, however.

The effectiveness of advertising dollars also continues to decline. In 1979-80, each $1,000 of advertising expense brought in between $9,000 and $9,500 in ticket income for each group. By fiscal 1991-92, the figure had slipped to $6,690 for large orchestras, $4,770 for medium orchestras, and $7,670 for small orchestras.

So far, the beginning year has been compared with the end year of the data. But what happened in between? The following trends can be identified:

• Total revenues increased rapidly from fiscal 1977 to fiscal 1981, and again from 1984 to 1988. After that, the trend flattens out. The same pattern is exhibited by earned income. Contributed income levels off as early as fiscal 1985.
• The declining rate of growth of contributed income is the result of two opposing trends--increased private support accompanied by declining government support.
• The whole increase in private support after fiscal 1985 was due to increased foundation support.
• Except for a brief pause between 1984 and 1986, NEA support has been in decline since 1979. The states tried to pick up the slack beginning in 1983, but after fiscal 1986 they were unable to maintain the momentum. Meanwhile, local support began to erode as well beginning in fiscal 1987.
• Total attendance also began to decline beginning in 1986, despite an increase in the total number of performances. At the same time, attendance at in-home subscription concerts rose steadily until 1990, then declined somewhat.
• The thirty-nine orchestras enjoyed a combined surplus in only one of the twenty-one years, and their deficits increased rapidly after 1987, as seen in figure 1.

Figure 2 suggests one reason why total attendance may have suffered: It plots the percent change in ticket prices against the percent change in real disposable (after-tax) personal income. The graph clearly shows that between the 1981 and 1983 fiscal years, and again between fiscal 1987 and 1992, ticket prices were increasing quite dramatically while the growth in personal income was declining. These are also the years when there was a decline in total attendance.

Preliminary regression runs show a highly significant relationship between attendance and both price and income (table 6). What these elasticities tell us is that a 10-percent increase in ticket prices is associated with a 3-percent decline in attendance at subscription concerts, but a 9-percent decline in attendance at nonsubscription concerts. Likewise, a 10-percent increase in income is associated with a 9-percent increase in attendance at subscription concerts and a 15-percent increase in attendance at nonsubscription concerts. In short, attendance at nonsubscription concerts is more sensitive to changes in both prices and incomes. Given the choice between raising subscription prices or prices of other concerts, therefore, an increase in subscription prices would lead to better results at the box office and a smaller drop in attendance. The orchestras chose, however, to raise non-subscription prices and attendance suffered.

When one calculates separate growth rates for large, medium, and small orchestras, the same phenomenon of leveling off or even decline, compared with the immediately preceding period, prevails. Table 7 shows the results. The slowdown occurred sometime in the mid-1980s and was experienced by opera and dance companies as well. The two exceptions shown in table 7 are the large growth spurt of individual support for the medium orchestras between 1988 and 1992 and the increase in subscriber attendance experienced by the small orchestras in the 1987-92 period. Foundation support has been too volatile to permit the calculation of a trend.

The constant sample of thirteen dance companies consists of seven ballet and six modern dance companies. They are the only ones for which annual data are consistently available for the fiscal years 1982-83 through 1991-92. The New York City Ballet was not included in the sample because it is so large that it would have biased the results. Although the two groups are much too small to be considered representative of the universe of ballet and modern dance companies, a comparison of their funding history is nevertheless instructive.

Ballet and modern dance companies must be considered separately as their financial experience is quite different. The average budget of ballet companies is almost four times that of a modern dance company. Table 8 shows the percentage change in aggregated real revenues and expenses over the ten-year period and the compound rate of growth. It may be seen that earned and performing income increased considerably more for ballet than for modern dance. Conversely, modern dance companies experienced a greater rise, or less of a decline, in all categories of contributed income. Nevertheless, total expenses and total salary expenses grew at identical rates. Dancers' salaries increased almost twice as fast for ballet companies as for modern companies, however. The difference is accounted for by the rise in modern dance administrative salaries. The number of administrators grew rapidly during the period, from twelve to forty, while the number of dancers increased only from seventy-one to eighty-one. For the seven ballet companies, the number of dancers increased from 216 to 233, administrators from 85 to 121.

Table 8 also shows the percent of total revenue derived from various income sources and expense categories as a percentage of total expenses. In fiscal 1991-92, ballet companies derived about two-thirds of their revenues from earned income and one-third from contributed income, virtually unchanged from ten years earlier. The remarkable revelation here is the complete reversal of the roles of earned income and contributed income for modern dance companies. In fiscal 1982-83, these companies derived 57 percent of their revenues from earned income and 43 percent from contributions. The situation was just the opposite in fiscal 1991-92, with 44 percent coming from earned income and 56 percent from contributions. Among sources of contributed income, the proportion from individuals and NEA increased for ballet companies, while every other source declined in importance. For modern dance companies, every category except state arts agency support increased, particularly foundation and NEA support. It is also apparent that ballet companies rely more heavily on individual support than any other kind, while modern dance companies depend most on foundation support.

The expense breakdown shows that salaries account for three-fifths of total ballet expenses and just over half of modern dance expenses. Dancers' salaries, however, make up less than 20 percent in both cases, and the percentage has declined from ten years earlier. Nonpersonnel expenses constitute a higher proportion of the total for modern dance companies than for ballet because the former are more active in touring.

The seven ballet companies enjoyed a combined surplus in eight of the ten years. The year-to-year changes are extremely erratic, however, having gone from a deficit of $744 million in fiscal 1990-91 to a surplus of $505 million in 1991-92. The situation was equally volatile for the modem dance companies. They saw a combined surplus in six of the ten years but went from a surplus of $655 million in 1990-91 to a deficit of $322 million in 1991-92, or 5.6 percent of total revenue. For both kinds of companies, the unrestricted fund balance has increased significantly, by a 6.4 percent compound rate of growth for ballet and a 20.3 percent rate for modem dance.

Again, looking at what occurred throughout the ten-year period rather than just at the beginning and end years, a few trends can be identified, even though trends can be quite volatile when one is dealing with a small number of companies. The following applies for ballet companies:

• Earned income increased at a faster rate between fiscal 1987-88 and 1991-92 than between 1984-85 and 1987-88. Contributed income declined somewhat after 1987-88, largely due to a significant drop in both corporate and foundation support. State arts agency contributions declined sharply beginning in fiscal 1988-89.
• Growth in salary expense has been faster since 1988-89 than in the previous period. The opposite is true for nonpersonnel expenses, with production and administrative expenses declining sharply beginning in 1989-90.
• Real average subscription prices rose steadily from 1982-83 to 1989-90, then declined.
• Attendance at regular subscription performances continued to grow fatfully, following a decline between 1984-85 and 1986-87. Growth in Nutcracker attendance leveled off after peaking in 1987-88.
• The number of both domestic and foreign tour performances is down significantly from 1982-83, while the number of home performances increased slightly.

With respect to modern dance companies we can observe the following:

• Growth of earned income began leveling off in 1985-86 and has declined from its peak in fiscal 1990-91.
• Contributed income grew rapidly from 1984-85 to 1989-90 then became flat. Foundation support has continued on a more-or-less steady upward trend since 1986--87 but at a slower rate than in previous years. Individual support grew rapidly from 1983-84 to 1990-91 then fell sharply in 1991-92. Corporate support has declined fairly steadily since fiscal 1984-85. NEA support continues to increase slowly. State arts agency support has been in decline since 1985-86, local support since 1989-90.
• Total salary expense continues to increase, but dancers' salaries were virtually unchanged in 1991-92 from their 1986-87 levels. Meanwhile, total administrative salaries continue to grow.
• Production and nonpersonnel administrative expenses have fallen from their 1989-90 peaks.
• Home attendance increased between fiscal years 1985-86 and 1988-89, in spite of a drop in the number of home performances, but has fallen to record low levels since 1988-89.
• The combined number of domestic and foreign tour performances increased from 1982-83 to 1985-86 but has since declined.

The opera data comprise information for a constant sample of twenty-four companies for the eleven fiscal years from 1980-81 through 1990-91. The Metropolitan Opera is not included in the sample so as not to bias the results. An additional year of information has since been made available and needs to be added to the data set. Also, separate analyses of the various sizes of opera companies must still be carried out. Of the twenty-four companies, nine are from the group with the largest budgets, eight are from the second-largest budget group, six are from the third, and one is from the fourth. The combined revenues and expenses of these twenty-four companies account for 69 percent of the total for the seventy-seven companies reporting to Opera America in fiscal year 1990-91, and therefore their experience may be considered as fairly representative of that of opera companies in the United States.

Table 9 again shows the percentage change in real revenues and expenses over this eleven-year period for the combined sample and the compound annual rate of growth for each category. Total revenues increased by 49.3 percent, total expenses by 54.2 percent. Earned income increased by 56.6 percent, considerably more than contributed income, which only grew by 41.7 percent.

Of the contributed income, private support grew by 51.8 percent, while government support increased by a paltry 1.4 percent. Of the private support, foundation support increased by 82.1 percent and individual gifts by 67.3 percent. Increases in city and state subsidies were almost completely negated by decreases in federal and county support, with NEA support declining by nearly one-third.

Salary expenses increased somewhat more than nonpersonnel expenses. Marketing and development salaries grew most rapidly while administrative salaries showed the least percentage increase. Among nonpersonnel expenses, production expense grew the least. During this period, the twenty-four companies as a group ended the fiscal year with a combined surplus in seven of the eleven years. However, combined deficits exceeded surpluses by a total of $1.6 million.

Table 9 also shows the contribution of each type of income to total revenues and its changing importance over the eleven-year period. Earned income increased by 2.5 percent, from 51.3 percent to 53.8 percent. Correspondingly, the proportion of contributed income fell by 2.5 percent. The importance of private support grew slightly while that of government support fell, led by the decline in NEA support. The NEA contribution is now only slightly more than enough to pay for marketing salaries.

In 1980-81, contributed income was made up of 80 percent private support and 20 percent government support. By 1990-91, this proportion had changed to 85.7 percent private and 14.3 percent government. The combined contribution of private plus foundation support increased by nearly 10 percent.

Table 9 shows that very little change occurred in the allocation of total expenses--roughly five-eighths representing salaries and three-eighths nonpersonnel expenses. The biggest change took place in the share of production expenses, which decreased by 4 percent. Apparently, this is the area that lends itself most readily to cost cutting, either by using less lavish sets and costumes or by renting them from another company, a practice that has become more common.

Viewing the data over the whole time span, it again becomes apparent that the eleven years often appear to consist of two distinct time periods, the earlier when the lines are rising more steeply, and the later period in which the lines flatten out. In most cases, the break occurs in fiscal 1986-87. Following up on this observation, real compound annual growth rates were calculated separately for fiscal years 1980-81 through 1986-87, and for 1986-87 through 1990-91 for those categories of revenues and expenses that exhibit this trait. The results are shown in table 10. In each case, the compound annual rate of growth declined sharply. In the case of corporate support and production expenses, the growth rate became negative. The growth of individual support changed from a healthy 8.8 percent per year to an anemic 0.1 percent. Unfortunately, the rate of growth of revenues declined by more than the growth rate of expenses, contributing to the large combined real deficit of more than $4 million in fiscal 1990-91. Exactly what caused this change in trend, and whether it will even hold up when one examines the different-sized companies separately, is not yet clear. There was a relevant change in the tax laws in 1986, but the U.S. economy as whole did not begin to slow down until the first quarter of 1988.

It is time to reexamine the conclusions drawn by the Ford Foundation to see how the nonprofit performing arts have fared over the last twenty years. The foundation's first conclusion was that in 1970-71, half of the organizations it surveyed had failed to balance their budgets. Of the 76 companies surveyed in the present study, 58 percent did not achieve a balanced budget in 1991-92. The percentages differ greatly among media, however. Orchestras had the highest proportion of balanced budgets with 69 percent, followed by modern dance companies with 67 percent. Forty-three percent of the ballet companies ran deficits, as did 42 percent of the opera companies. Even more important than the number of companies carrying deficits is the size of the shortfalls. Normally, the ability to carry debt is based on income and assets. Even with the huge increase in deficits that orchestras have seen in recent years, their combined deficit represented a smaller proportion of total revenues in 1991-92 than it did twenty years earlier. Although one might wish that the deficits were not increasing, they are clearly not as critical as some reports might have us believe.

The second conclusion of the Ford Foundation report was that contributed income would have to increase substantially for the organizations to maintain their 1970-71 position. If one interprets this statement to refer to absolute dollar amounts, it certainly turned out to be correct. As a percentage of total revenue, however, contributed income has held surprisingly steady. Table 11 presents the various income sources as a percentage of total revenue for the beginning and ending years for each medium. The proportion of contributed income actually declined slightly for orchestras and operas. The 0.3 percent increase for dance companies was entirely due to the influence of modern dance companies' increase of contributed income from 43 percent to 56 percent.

The third conclusion of the Ford Foundation report was that the private sector would continue to be the mainstay of the nonprofit performing arts. This statement is also true, but not for the reasons envisioned at the time. What the authors projected was that earned income would grow by 4.2 percent a year while expenses were increasing by 7.1 percent, requiring contributed income to grow by 11.8 percent annually. This scenario did not materialize. Except for modern dance companies, earned income actually grew slightly faster than expenses. The real reason that the proportion of private support needed to increase was to substitute for government support. Even the pessimistic alternative projected by the Ford Foundation foresaw a seven fold increase in government subvention. That simply did not happen.

A close examination of table 11 leads to the astonishing conclusion that things have changed very little over the past twenty years. That does not mean that there are not financial problems in the performing arts. The modern dance companies appear to be in serious difficulty. The almost universal drop in attendance, partly due to the unfortunate nature and timing of ticket price increases, is cause for worry. Undoubtedly, there are many other reasons as well--audiences' decreasing leisure time, more and better technological substitutes for live performances, concerns about urban safety, to name just a few. Also worrisome is the fact that expenses are being held down by reducing production costs. That may, in the end, be counterproductive if it leads to performances of lower quality. Equally troubling is the fact that the status quo has partly been paid for by the artists and administrators themselves in the form of reduced salary increases. The worst news probably is that the companies in this study represent the survivors. There are many others that did not survive to be included in the group.

There is some good news as well. The bogeyman of an ever-rising earnings gap has been laid to rest. Earned income growth has kept pace with expenses. Private contributions have stepped in to substitute for government support. In fact, preliminary results of an investigation into the relationship between income and private support indicate that private contributions may increase by as much as 2 percent for every one percent increase in real disposable personal income. This line of research needs to be pursued further, including ascertaining the effects of changes in marginal tax rates on individual and corporate support.

The goal of research along the lines presented here is to provide arts administrators with information that will reduce the degree of uncertainty under which they must often make decisions and allow them to anticipate the outcomes of those decisions instead of having to react to events. Knowing the sensitivity of attendance to changes in prices and incomes permits more rational pricing policies. Separate estimates can be calculated for companies of different art media and different sizes, as well as for individual companies. These may differ from the averages, such as the ones presented in this paper.[3] Data of this sort also lend themselves to forecasts of box office receipts and contributed income. All of this information should make it possible to steer the nonprofit performing arts into less-troubled waters.[4]

1. The Ford Foundation, The Finances of the Performing Arts, Volume 1 (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1974).

2. Noncontributed income is earned income plus endowment/investment income.

3. Felton, M. V. "On the Assumed Inelasticity of Demand for the Performing Arts," Journal of Cultural Economics 16(1): 1-12.

4. The author wishes to thank Heather Dinwiddie and Dan Patterson of the American Symphony Orchestra League, Diane Brace of Dance/USA, Nancy Roberts-Lea of Opera America, and Barbara Janowitz of Theatre Communications Group for facilitating access to the data. She also thanks Sherrie Hammond for her assistance in producing the tables and charts.

Legend for Chart:

A - Percentage change 1972-92
B - Compound rate of growth 1972-92(%)
C - Percentage of total revenues: 71/72
D - Percentage of total revenues: 91/92
E - Percentage of contributed income: 71/72
F - Percentage of contributed income: 91/92

Total revenues   +126.5   4.2   100.0   100.0     --      --

Non-contributed  +130.3   4.3    63.6    64.6     --      --
 income

Concert income   +126.0   4.2    41.8    41.7     --      --

Season ticket    +134.9   4.3     --      --      --      --
 income[1]

Single ticket    +136.3   4.4     --      --      --      --
 income[1]

Other concert    +118.8   4.0     --      --      --      --
 income

Contributed      +120.0   4.0    36.4    35.4   100.0   100.0
 income

Private support  +167.1   5.0    25.3    29.9    69.5    84.4

Individual       +111.1   2.8    12.3    11.5    33.7    32.4
 support

Corporate        +208.3   5.8     5.4     7.4    14.9     21.0
 support

Foundation     +3,362.0  19.4     0.2     3.5     0.6      9.8
 support

Government        +12.5   0.6    11.1     5.5    30.5     15.6
 support

Local support      -9.1  -0.5     4.0     1.6    11.0      4.6

State support    +114.3   3.9     2.2     2.1      6.0     5.8

NEA support       -38.1  -2.4     4.7     1.3     12.8     3.6

Real Deficit     +105.8   3.7     5.4     4.9      --      --

                                   Percentage of total expenses
                                       71/72      91/92

Total expenses   +125.3   4.1          100.0   100.0

Total artists'   +96.4    3.4           58.5    51.0
 salaries

Orchestra        +68.2    2.6           46.5    34.7
 salaries

Production       +46.5    1.9           29.8    19.4
 expense

Advertising      +314.5   7.4            4.1     7.6
 expense

Development      +634.2  10.5            1.5     5.0
 expense

Administrative   +227.5   6.1            5.8     8.4
 expense

Average           +94.5   3.4
 subscription
 price

In-home           +33.7   1.5
 subscriber
 attendance

Regular           +53.0   2.1
 subscription
 performances

Average price,   +135.5   4.4
 all concerts

Total season     -4.0    -0.2
 attendance

Total number of  +8.2     0.4
 performances

Legend for Chart:

A - Large Orchestras: Percentage change
B - Large Orchestras: Compound rate of growth (%)
C - Medium orchestras: Percentage change
D - Medium orchestras: compound rate of growth (%)
E - Small orchestras: Percentage change
F - Small orchestras: compound rate of growth

  A           B           C           D           E          F

Total revenues

121.34       4.05       304.90       7.24       131.33      4.28

Non-contributed income

126.57       4.17       281.64       6.93       119.32      4.00

Concert income

119.75       4.02       361.80       7.95       133.30      4.33

Season tickets[a]

135.15       4.37       101.23       3.56       158.74      4.87

Single tickets[a]

136.91       4.41       113.15       3.86       176.16      5.20

Other concert income

107.05       3.71       784.28      11.51        96.82      3.44

Contributed income

112.02       3.92       334.72       7.62       141.86      4.51

Private support

158.89       4.87       363.93       7.97       178.75      5.26

Individual support

103.41       3.61       330.38       7.32       250.30      6.47

Corporate support

197.26       5.60       527.75       9.62       504.86      9.42

Foundation support

3409.09     19.47        --         31.49[b]    902.31     12.21

Government support

7.75         0.37       219.51       5.98        13.67      0.64

Local

- 12.92     -0.69       267.13       6.72       -16.70     -0.91

State

105.69       3.67       410.16       8.49       666.46     10.72

NEA

-40.11      -2.53        57.42       2.29       -53.82     -3.79

Legend for chart:

A - Large Orchestras: Percentage change
B - Large Orchestras: Compound rate of growth (%)
C - Medium orchestras: Percentage change
D - Medium orchestras: compound rate of growth (%)
E - Small orchestras: Percentage change
F - Small orchestras: compound rate of growth

  A           B           C           D           E          F

Total expenses

120.48       4.03       292.68      7.08        129.17      4.23

Total artists' salaries

91.61        3.30       262.58       6.65       102.28      3.59

Orchestra salaries

63.70        2.49       208.00       5.79        78.41      2.94

Production expense

43.38        1.82       199.34       5.64        53.28      2.16

Advertising expense

293.83       6.85       951.96      12.49      1554.03     15.06

Development expense

577.51      10.04     9475.69      25.62        --        16.45[a]

Administrative expense

84.29        4.03       188.49       5.44       243.74      6.87

Real deficit

104.51       3.64       163.79       4.97        82.76      3.06

Percentage Change and Compound Rate of Growth of Selected
Operational Data

Attendance at in-home subscription concerts

32.3         1.4         51.3        2.1         54.3       2.2

Number of subscription performances

50.5         2.1        105.9        3.7         22.6       1.0

Total season attendance

-9.7        -0.5        117.8        4.0         81.3       3.0

Total performances

-1.6        -0.1        197.5        5.6         36.1       1.6

Average subscription price

95.8         3.4         64.4        2.5         95.3       3.4

Legend for Chart:

A - Large orchestras: 1972
B - Large orchestras: 1992
C - Medium orchestras: 1972
D - Medium orchestras: 1992
E - Small orchestras: 1972
F - Small orchestras: 1992

                            A     B     C     D     E     F

Non-contributed income     64.0  65.5  56.2  53.0  46.7  44.3
Concert income             42.0  41.7  38.6  44.0  32.2  32.5
Season ticket              15.5  16.5  19.6   9.7  14.5  16.3
Single ticket               3.2   3.5   4.4   2.3   3.4   4.1
Other concert              23.2  21.7  14.6  32.0  14.2  12.1
Contributed income         36.0  34.5  43.8  47.0  53.3  55.7
Private support            24.8  29.0  35.0  40.1  41.4  49.9
Individual support         12.3  11.3  12.9  13.1  10.5  15.9
Corporate support           5.5   7.4   5.3   8.2   2.9  7.7
Foundation support          0.2   3.5   0     3.1   1.3  5.5
Government support         11.2   5.4   8.9   7.0  11.9  5.8
Local support               4.1   1.6   2.0   1.8   4.9  1.8
State support               2.2   2.1   1.6   2.0   0.7  2.3
NEA support                 4.7   1.3   4.0   1.5   6.3  1.3
Deficit                     5.4   5.0   5.2   3.4   4.6  3.6

Legend for Chart:

A - Large orchestras: 1972
B - Large orchestras: 1992
C - Medium orchestras: 1972
D - Medium orchestras: 1992
E - Small orchestras: 1972
F - Small orchestras: 1992

                           A     B     C     D     E     F

Total artists' salaries   58.2  50.9  58.8  54.3  56.2  49.7
Orchestra salaries        46.4  34.4  50.6  39.7  47.0  36.6
Production expenses       30.1  19.6  21.4  16.3  21.3  14.2
Advertising expenses       4.2   7.5   3.6   9.5   1.2   8.7
Development expenses       1.6   4.9   0.3   7.2   0     4.7
Administrative expenses    5.6   8.2  10.9  10.6  10.6  17.7
Other expenses             0.3   8.9   5.0   2.1  10.7   5.0

                              Price        Income       Adjusted
                           elasticity     elasticity    R2

Total attendance           .84[**a]         1.44[**]        .81
                           (- 9.35)[b]      (9.08)

Attendance at in-home      .30[**]          .91[**]         .91

subscription concerts      (- 3.80)         (8.17)

Attendance at              .92[**]          1.50[**]        .88
non-subscription           (- 11.07)        (9.17)
concerts

Legend for Chart:

A - Large orchestras: Previous trend: years growth (%)
B - Large orchestras: Most recent trend: years growth (%)
C - Medium orchestras: Previous trend: Years growth (%)
D - Medium orchestras: Most recent trend: Years growth (%)
E - Small orchestras: Previous trend: Years growth (%)
F - Small orchestras: Most recent trend: Years growth (%)

Total revenue            77-87   5.9   87-92   0.6  81-89   6.9
                         89-92   2.6   83-87   6.1  87-92   1.9

Non-contributed income   77-87   6.2   87-92   0.8  77-84  11.2
                         84-92   2.8   78-86   4.3  86-92   0.8

Contributed income       76-85   5.8   85-92   0.9  76-86  11.3
                         86-92   5.1   79-87   5.3  87-92   1.2

Private support          79-85   9.8   85-92   1.7  76-86   9.3
                         86-92   6.5   81-88   5.0  88-92   1.5

Individual support       80-84   10.4  84-92   1.8  77-88   6.3
                         88-92   16.3  82-86   8.9  86-92   1.0

Corporate support        80-85   11.2  85-92   0.3  78-87   18.0
                         87-92   -4.6  81-88  11.2  88-92  -11.5

Total expense            77-86    5.7  86-92   1.8  82-89    8.5
                         89-92    1.1  83-87   6.1  87-92    2.2

Orchestra salaries       77-87    3.1  87-92   1.1  79-89    7.6
                         89-92    0.1  79-88   3.8  88-92   -1.3

Subscriber attendance    76-90    1.1  90-92  -1.9  76-84    6.8
                         84-92   -2.0  83-87  -5.5  87-92    3.4

Total attendance         83-86    8.4  86-92  -4.7  80-89    4.8
                         89-92  -11.9  81-90   2.1  90-92   -3.4

Average subscription     82-88   7.5   88-92   2.5  82-88    6.2
 price                   88-92   4.8   82-89   3.5  89-92    3.2

A - 7 Ballet Companies: Percentage change 1983-92
B - 7 Ballet Companies: Compound rate of growth 1983-92 (%)
C - 7 Ballet Companies: Percentage of total revenues 82/83 91/92
D - 6 Modern Dance Companies: Percentage change 1983-92
E - 6 Modern Dance Companies: Compound rate of growth 83-92 (%)
F - 6 Modern Dance Companies: Percentage of total revenues 82/83
91/92

                  A     B         C        D      E        F

Total
  revenue       71.6   6.2  100.0  100.0  60.4   5.4  100.0  100.0

Earned
  income        78.2   6.6   63.4   65.8  23.6   2.4   57.0  43.9

Performance
  income        70.5   6.1   53.8   53.5  20.8   2.1   45.9  34.6

Contributed
  income        60.2   5.4   36.6   34.2  109.1  8.5   43.0  56.1

Individual
  support      111.7   8.7   11.0   13.6  160.6  11.2  6.0   9.7

Corporate
  support       38.5   3.7    4.9    4.0  116.0  8.9   4.2   5.7

Foundation
  support        4.5   0.5    7.2    4.4  108.6  8.5  13.7  17.8

United Arts
  Fund support  27.7   2.8    2.0    1.5   0     0      0     0

Local
  government
  support       54.3   4.9    2.4    2.1  --    --      0     1.0

State arts
  agency       -43.5  -6.1    1.8    0.6  -24.8  -1.4   6.1   2.9
  support

NEA support    167.0  11.5    0.9    1.4  204.4  13.2   6.3  12.0

Other support   76.4  6.5     6.4    6.6  68.7   6.0    6.8   7.1

                      Percentage of        Percentage of
                      total expenses       total expenses
                      82/83 91/92          82/83  91/92

Total expenses   68.8  6.0  100.0 100.0  75.0  6.0  100.0  100.0
Total salaries   77.1  6.6   57.6  60.5  78.2  6.6   50.2  53.2
Dancers'
 salaries        67.1  5.9   17.9  17.7  35.3  3.4   24.0  19.3
Total
 non-personnel   57.4  5.2   42.4  39.5  71.6  6.2   45.9  46.8
expenses

Legend for Chart:

A - Percentage change 1981-91
B - Compound rate of growth 1981-91 (%)
C - Percentage of total revenues 80/81 90/91
D - Percentage of contributed income 80/81 90/91

                          A      B        C              D

Total revenues          +49.3   4.1  100.0  100.0    --    --
Earned income           +56.6   4.6   51.3   53.8    --    --
Contributed income      +41.7   3.5   48.7   46.2   100.0  100.0
Private support         +51.8   4.3   38.9   39.6    80.0   85.7
Individual support      +67.3   5.3   16.0   17.9    32.8   38.7
Corporate support       +35.0   3.1    7.0    6.4    14.3   13.8
Foundation support      +82.1   6.2    6.7    8.1    13.7   17.6
United Arts Fund        +39.2   3.4    1.8    1.7     3.8    3.7
  support
Government support      +1.4    0.1    9.7    6.6     20.0  14.3
City support            +31.5   2.8    2.0    1.8     4.1    3.9
County support          -5.7   -0.6    0.3    0.2     0.6    0.4
State arts agency       +9.1    0.9    2.0    1.5     4.3    3.3
  support
Other state support     +78.1   5.9    0.5    0.6     1.0    1.3
NEA support             -32.7  -3.9    4.4    2.0     9.0    4.3

                                             Percentage of
                                             total expenses
                                              80/81 90/91

Total expenses            +54.2     4.4     100.0    100.0
Salary expenses           +57.9     4.7      61.5     63.0
Performing artists'       +51.7     4.3      29.8     29.3
  salaries
Other artistic salaries   +35.9     3.1       5.2      4.6
Production salaries       +67.7     5.3      14.5     15.8
Marketing salaries       +106.6     7.5       1.3      1.8
Development salaries     +156.5     9.9       1.7      2.9
Administrative salaries  +18.4      1.7       8.3      6.4
Non-personnel expenses   +48.1      4.0      38.5     37.0
Production expense       +25.2      2.3      21.4     17.4
Marketing expense        +65.9      5.2       5.6      6.1
Development expense      +43.2      3.7       2.8      2.6
Administrative expense   +45.1      3.5       7.3      6.6
Other expenses[a]        +374.6    16.9       1.4      4.3

FY 1980-81 to        FY 1986-87 to
                        FY 1986-87           FY 1990-91

Total revenues             5.8                 1.5
Earned income              6.5                 1.8
Contributed income         5.1                 1.2
Private support            6.1                 1.1
Individual support         8.8                 0.1
Corporate support          5.6                -0.2
Total expenses             5.9                 2.3
Salary Expense             6.2                 2.3
Performing artists'
  salaries                 6.1                 1.6
Production salaries        8.2                 1.2
Non-personnel expenses     5.2[a]              2.2[b]
Production expenses        4.5[a]            - 1.0[b]

Legend for Chart:

A - Orchestra 1972
B - Opera 1981
C - Ballet 1983
D - Modern dance 1983
E - Orchestra 1992
F - Opera 1991
G - Ballet 1992
H - Modern dance 1992

                             A         B        C        D
                             E         F        G        H

Earned income               63.6      51.3     63.4     57.0
                            64.6      53.8     65.8     43.9

Contributed                 36.4      48.7     36.6     43.0
  income                    35.4      46.2     34.2     56.1

Private support             25.3      38.9     31.5     30.7
                            29.9      39.6     30.1[a]  40.3[a]

Individual                  12.3      16.0     11.0       6.0
   support                  11.5      17.9     13.6       9.7

Corporate                    5.4       7.0      4.9       4.2
   support                   7.4       6.4      4.0       5.7

Foundation                   0.2       6.7      7.2      13.7
   support                   3.5       8.1      4.4      17.8

Other private                7.4       9.2      6.4[a]    6.8[a]
   support                   7.5       7.2      6.6[a]    7.1[a]

Government                  11.1       9.7      5.1      12.4
   support                   5.5       6.6      4.1      15.9

Local support                4.0       2.3      2.4       0
                             1.6       2.0      2.1       1.0

State support                2.2       2.5      1.8[b]    6.1[b]
                             2.1       2.1      0.6[b]    2.9[b]

NEA support                  4.7       4.4      0.9       6.3
                             1.3       2.0      1.4      12.0

Marianne Victorius Felton is a professor of economics at Indiana University Southeast in New Albany, Indiana. Her research has been concentrated in the field of cultural economics. Support for the project described in this article was provided by a grant-in-aid of research from Indiana University Southeast.